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ABSTRACT
Advances in information and communication technology (ICT) have provided a plat-
form for the introduction and diffusion of a range of financial technologies that have
transformed the financial sector. This study analyses the diffusion of financial technol-
ogy (fintech) and its interaction with financial inclusion and living standards (GDP per
capita). We consider the determinants and effects of technology diffusion in financial
services and identify two possible transmission mechanisms from the financial sec-
tor to GDP per capita – a fintech diffusion channel and a financial inclusion channel.
We specify the interactions between these two channels and their relationship with
income per capita. Our empirical analysis focuses on the diffusion of two enabling
fintech innovations: ATMs and associated digital networks; and mobile phones and
payments systems. The relationships between fintech diffusion, financial inclusion and
GDP per capita are estimated using a panel data set for up to 137 countries over the
period 1991–2015 using both cross section and panel techniques, including an error
correction model that distinguishes short- and long-run effects. A key finding is that
fintech diffusion and financial inclusion have long-run effects on GDP per capita over
and above their short-run impact and the effects of investment in fixed and human
capital.
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1. Introduction
The financial sector has experienced something of a technological revolution over recent decades as information
and communication technology (ICT) platforms have facilitated the diffusion of an array of financial tech-
nologies (fintech) from automated teller machines (ATMs) and associated digital networks, mobile payments
systems, mobile wallets online banking, automated credit scoring techniques (robo advisers) and block-chain
technologies.1 It is only recently that the term fintech2 has slipped into common usage, however, the emer-
gence of fintech has its roots in the development of ATM networks in the 1980s and 1990s. The digitalisation
of financial services and the creation of secure, non-proprietary digital networks enabled the growth of ATM
networks and provided a technological platform for further advances in fintech, including internet banking,
mobile money and digital payments systems.While the diffusion of fintech has transformed the financial sector,
few studies have investigated the effect of technological change in the financial services sector on financial inclu-
sion and living standards. The present paper aims to fill this gap by exploring the factors driving the diffusion of
two enabling financial technologies and their impact on financial inclusion and per capita incomes in over 130
countries. In particular, we specify a fintech diffusion channel and a financial inclusion channel to explore how
technological change in the financial services sector impacts the real economy.
Fintech diffusion provides an important channel via which financial sector development may permanently
raise living standards. This channel is worthy of consideration as it is well known that most of the benefits from
innovation flownot from the original production of ideas, or inventions, but from their widespread adoption and
use by firms and households (Comin and Hobijn 2010; Stoneman and Battisti 2010). The diffusion of fintech via
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the creation of digital networks, associated ATMnetworks, mobile money and payments systems, has direct and
indirect effects. Digitalisation of financial services and the creation of non-proprietary digital networks can raise
productivity and efficiency in the financial services sector itself – where the effects are likely to be strong because
of positive network externalities (Hall and Kahn 2003; Scott, Van Reenen, and Zachariadis 2017). In addition,
digital networks provide a technological platform on which to expand the reach of financial service providers,
thus increasing financial inclusion (Batiz-Lazo 2018), mobilising savings and enhancing both the extent and
allocation of investment in the wider economy. Financial technologies, such as, mobile phones, money and
payments systems, may also ‘enable developing countries to “leapfrog” to more efficient and modern economic
systems’ (Lashitew, van Tulder, and Liasses 2019, 1201), thus promoting convergence across countries.
This paper extends the existing literatures on fintech diffusion and financial inclusion in the following ways.
First, we examine the factors shaping the diffusion of two pervasive fintech products – automated tellermachines
(ATMs) that exemplify the use of digital networks (Batiz-Lazo 2018), andmobile phones and payments systems.
Second, we consider the factors shaping financial inclusion, including the role of ATMs, digital networks and
mobile phone and payments systems, as well as socio-economic factors (Graff 2005). Third, we analyse the joint
impact of these two effects – fintech diffusion and financial inclusion – on GDP per capita in both the short run
and the long run. We also consider the inter-relations between fintech diffusion, financial inclusion and GDP
per capita. Our theoretical analysis identifies both a fintech diffusion channel and a financial inclusion channel,
thus identifying two transmission mechanisms from the finance sector to the real economy that capture the
enabling features of ICT and fintech mentioned by Lashitew, van Tulder, and Liasses (2019), Baldwin (2016) the
FSA (2019) and Leong and Sung (2018). The fintech diffusion channel captures the direct and indirect effects
of technological progress in financial services on productivity in the financial sector and the wider economy via
more efficient provision of financial services to households, business and government. It is distinct fromprevious
work, for example, the ‘ideas’ production channel identified by Madsen and Ang (2016) since it focuses on the
diffusion and use of financial technologies, associated network externalities and knock on effects.3
Fourth, in order to capture short and long-run effects, we employ an error correctionmodel that enables us to
identify long-run relationships between fintech, financial inclusion and living standards. Themodel is estimated
using a panel data set for up to 137 countries over a 25-year time span (1991–2015). A key finding is that fintech
diffusion and financial inclusion have long run effects on GDP per capita over and above their short run impact
through capital accumulation.
The remaining sections are organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literatures on tech-
nology diffusion, financial sector development and growth. Section 3 explains our hypotheses concerning the
channels via which key financial technologies may influence financial inclusion and living standards (allowing
for the possibility of feedback effects) and describes the derivation and specification of our econometric mod-
els. Section 4 provides discussion of our datasets and presents results from our econometric estimations using
cross section analysis, including single equationmodels, three stage least squares and panel data analysis with an
error correction model that allows us to identify the short and long-run effects of fintech diffusion and financial
inclusion on GDP per capita. The results from our error correction model provide evidence of significant long-
run relationships between the extent of diffusion of key financial technologies, financial inclusion and GDP per
capita. The final section of the paper draws a number of conclusions for policy makers and identifies areas for
further research.
2. Transmission channels in the finance-growth nexus
King and Levine’s (1993) seminal paper on financial development and growth starts from the Schumpeterian
thesis that finance is essential for innovation and economic development and explores the relationship between
various indicators of financial development and growth. The main channels identified by King and Levine stem
from the role of financial intermediaries in catalysing savings and investment, and improving the allocation
of capital, thus enabling innovation in the wider economy. Notwithstanding their emphasis on Schumpeter’s
‘finance-innovation-economic development’ thesis, there has been relatively little discussion of how finance
leverages technological change. Rather, the emphasis in much of the finance-growth literature has been on the
role of financial sector development on savings, investment and capital allocation, and much empirical analysis
THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE 3
has focused on reduced form estimates of relationships between indicators of financial development and growth.
The lack of attention to the creation and diffusion of innovations is curious, as a well-known result from growth
theory is that while savings and investment may affect growth in the short run, in the long run productivity and
growth are determined by technological change.
AsMadsen andAng (2016) note, many studies on the finance-growth nexus utilise cross section or panel data
techniques to regress growth, or GDP per capita, on indicators of financial development without exploring the
transmission mechanisms from the financial sector to the real economy and few studies (King and Levine 1993;
Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Benhabib and Spiegel 2000; Graff 2005; Laeven, Levine, and Michalopoulos
2015; Madsen and Ang 2016; Comin and Nanda 2019 are notable exceptions) have explored the role of finance
in shaping total factor productivity growth (TFP) or technological change. Of these, King and Levine (1993) and
Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) estimate TFP as a residual after accounting for growth in capital and labour
inputs and regress estimates of residual TFP on measures of financial intermediation and development. Both
studies find that TFP is positively and significantly correlated with financial development.
However, the question of how technological innovations are created and diffused has received little attention
in the finance-growth literature. Madsen and Ang (2016) provide new insight into the invention channel link-
ing finance and growth, by explicitly using an ‘ideas’ production function (Porter and Stern 2000) as a core
mechanism via which financial sector development leads to permanent increases in living standards (Mad-
sen and Ang 2016, 552). Using an endogenous growth framework, their results demonstrate the importance
of the finance-invention-growth channel (beyond savings, investment and capital allocation) using a specially
constructed panel database for 21 OECD countries over the period 1870–2009.
WhileMadsen andAng’s study finds empirical evidence of a finance-invention-growth channel, their focus is
on ‘ideas’ production in the wider economy, and they do not explicitly consider technological innovation in the
financial sector per se.Nor do theymodel the extent of diffusion of financial technologies.4 Indeed, despite recent
interest in fintech, relatively little attention has been devoted to financial innovation as a transmission channel
fromfinancial sector development to productivity and growth. An early study by Silber (1983) reviewed 38 finan-
cial innovations includingATMs and electronic payments and found that they reducedfinancial constraints, thus
enhancing welfare at the macro level. Similarly, Zilberfarb (1989) found that ATMs increased demand deposits.
More recently, Laeven, Levine, andMichalopoulos (2015), Beck et al. (2016), considered the impact of financial
innovation on growth and macroeconomic development, while Lashitew, van Tulder, and Liasses (2019) and
Jagtiani and Lemieux (2018) explore the effects of mobile phones and fintech on financial inclusion.
Thewider literature on innovation and technology diffusion suggests additional channels thatmay potentially
underlie the finance-growth nexus, most notably the adoption and diffusion of financial technologies and their
interrelations with financial inclusion and prosperity. While the invention of new products and processes is an
important source of productivity growth, it is their diffusion that has the largest impact on the level of economic
development and living standards. Comin and Hobijn (2010) estimate that the average time for technologies to
diffuse across countries is 45 years, and that differences in the extent of diffusion account for around 25% of
the differences in GDP per capita across countries. Yet, the role of technology diffusion generally, and of fintech
diffusion in particular, has received little attention in the finance-growth literature to date. Understanding fintech
diffusion is important since the omnipresent use of financial services by business, households and government
suggests that technology induced productivity gains in the financial sector can have far-reaching effects on the
real economy.
The ability of financial systems to mobilise and channel savings to finance both R&D (‘ideas’ production)
and technology diffusion is important in catalysing technological progress and associated improvements in liv-
ing standards. The extent of financial inclusion plays a critical part in this process. However, standard models
often assume that everyone is banked and ignore differences in financial sector coverage associated with the
fact that around 1.7 billion people over the age of 15 are excluded from formal financial systems (World Bank
2018). Put differently, formal financial systems are currently unable to mobilise the savings of around 30% of the
world’s adult population and the extent of financial inclusion varies significantly across countries and over time.
Extant empirical research shows that an increase in financial inclusion is associated with an increase in savings,
consumption and productive investments (Dupas and Robinson 2013). Given the productivity and equality-
enhancing effects of financial inclusion, governments around the world have more inclusive finance as a policy
4 D. KANGA ET AL.
objective as a means of raising savings and investment. Fintech diffusion provides an important transmission
mechanism via which productivity gains and increases in financial inclusion raise GDP per capita. It also opens
up the possibility of effective policy instruments centred on catalysing technology diffusion and developing
fintech infrastructure and support.
In the following section, we set out two specific channels via which financial sector development may influ-
ence living standards – the fintech diffusion channel and the financial inclusion channel – and the interactions
between them. In particular, we study the diffusion and impact of two key financial technologies that have trans-
formed finance – ATMs and associated digital networks; and mobile phone network payments systems – their
interaction with each other and their relationship with financial inclusion and per capita income over time and
across countries.
Figure 1. Mobile phone penetration rate (data fromWorld Development Indicators). Source: figures created by the authors.
Note: This figure shows the penetration rate of mobile phone across the globe before 2000. The penetration rate is measured by the number of mobile cellular
subscriptions (per 100 people).
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Figure 2. Diffusion of ATMs. Source: Batiz-Lazo (2018).
There is some evidence to suggest that ICT technologies are diffusingmore quickly than traditional technolo-
gies such as rail, passenger cars and electricity production (Comin and Hobijn 2010), however, Figure 1 shows
that fintech diffusion is a slow and variable process across time and countries. Panels A and B illustrate the point
with respect to mobile phones: while the extent of diffusion has increased over time, the variability remains
high across countries some 40 years after mobile phone technology was initially introduced. Figure 2 shows the
adoption of ATMs which has grown significantly since they were first introduced. As Batiz-Lazo (2018) notes,
ATMs embody digital networks and markets, interoperability protocols, security software, and card recogni-
tion/reading technologies, that are every bit as significant, if not more significant technologically, than the cash
machines themselves. There is considerable variation in the extent of diffusion of ATMs, with the number of
ATMs per capita varying from zero to 1.88, and much of the growth in the total number of ATMs reflecting
catch up by lagging economies driven by growing financial inclusion (Batiz-Lazo 2018).
3. Technology diffusion, financial inclusion and GDP per capita
A variety of approaches have been used in the finance-growth literature. Studies, such as King and Levine (1993)
and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) are couched in terms of Solow-type growthmodels that are used to estimate
TFP and seek to endogenise the residual by regressing TFP on finance variables and control variables. Building
on this approach, we start from a standard production function (Aghion and Howitt 1998),
Y = AKα(hL)1−α (1)
where Y is output (GDP), A represents technology and other factors affecting productivity, K is the stock of
capital, h is human capital per worker, L is employment and the exponents α and 1-α can be considered as factor










When expressed in terms of growth, long-run improvements in GDP per capita depend on improvements in
human capital and changes in A or technological progress. In terms of levels of GDP per capita, A is a pro-
ductivity parameter that represents the extent of technological diffusion (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1997) and
non-technological factors that influence the efficiency of technologies and factors of production, for example,
social capital, governance, trust (Graff 2005; Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Comin and Hobijn 2010).
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Madsen and Ang (2016) identify an ‘ideas’ production transmission channel from financial sector develop-
ment to technological progress, by specifying growth in A as a function of research and development (R&D)
intensity, financial development and scale effects. Hence, increases in income per capita are determined in the
short run by investment in fixed and human capital, while permanent or long-run increases in productivity
are shaped by ‘ideas’ production facilitated by financial development. Provided there are scale effects, financial
sector development has long-run impact on growth and prosperity.
Instead of focusing on R&D and ideas production, we analyse a diffusion transmission mechanism that cap-
tures the impact of fintech diffusion on GDP per capita. The extent of technological diffusion is distinct from
‘ideas’ production or invention, and an important determinant of technological capability and productivity.
Moreover, it is the diffusion of technology rather than its invention that has the largest impact on productivity
and GDP per capita. Fintech diffusion or the adoption of financial technologies also determines and is deter-
mined by, financial inclusion – as mobile payments or digital ATM networks expand, the greater the benefits
to individual users from network externalities or scale effects. Non-proprietary digital networks and payments
systems that connect customers across many banks, provide platforms for improved financial service provision
that enhances financial inclusion. Digital networks and payments systems are subject to positive network exter-
nalities or scale effects arising from the greater benefits of using mobile payments systems or ATMmachines as
the network of users and banks expands.
Numerous studies have confirmed that cross country differences in income per capita are related to cross-
country differences in the extent of technological diffusion (e.g.Hall andKahn 2003; Caselli 2005; Freeman 1989;
Hall and Jones 1999; Hsieh and Klenow 2010). In our empirical estimations, we endogenise, A, by specifying it
as a function of the extent of the technological diffusion, and non-technological factors, such as, institutional
quality (Graff 2005) and financial inclusion. Financial inclusion is also determined by the extent of diffusion of
financial technology, since mobile phones and ATMs increase access to financial services, and both variables
influence income per capita through A.
Thus, we have a three equation system that we specify econometrically across countries and time, where:
(i) income per capita in country i at time t is determined by capital accumulation, human capital, employment
and Ait , which is a function of the extent of fintech diffusion, financial inclusion and other variables;
(ii) the extent of fintech diffusion is shaped by financial inclusion and GDP per capita and a number of
economic and socio-economic variables (Graff 2005); and
(iii) financial inclusion is determined by GDP per capita, fintech, financial infrastructure, economic structure
and socio-economic variables, including political and economic stability and freedom from corruption.
We discuss each of these in turn in Sections 3.1–3.3 below.
3.1. Determinants of the extent of fintech diffusion
In view of the fact that most of the benefits from inventions come not from ‘ideas’ production or invention but
from their widespread adoption and diffusion, our econometric specification lets the productivity or technology
parameter, Ait , be proxied by the extent of diffusion, Dict(:
Dict = αit + α1FIit + α2yit +
J∑
j=3
αjXjit + uit (3)
where Dict is the extent of diffusion of technology c in country i(i = 1, . . . ,N), at time t. FIit is the financial
inclusion index, yit is the GDP per capita, X1it , . . . ,XPit are control variables, including trade, which is expected
to stimulate innovation diffusion (Eaton and Kortum 1996), urbanisation, and a composite stability index, while
uit is a disturbance term.
We proxy the extent of fintech diffusion by ATM networks and mobile phone usage. ATM networks incor-
porate sophisticated digital networks and security technology, while mobile phones, wallets and associated
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payments systems rely on complex digital networks and security protocols. Both are subject to positive net-
work externalities because the utility of these technologies increases, as the number of banks, payments system
agents, firms, and retail customers connected to the respective networks, increases. We therefore expect finan-
cial inclusion to have a positive effect on fintech diffusion. This direct transmission mechanism from financial
inclusion to fintech diffusion stems fundamentally from positive network externalities and is in addition to the
positive effect that financial inclusion may have on income per capita via savings and capital investment, which
is specified in Equation (5) below.
3.2. Effect of fintech diffusion on financial inclusion
Financial inclusion is determined by financial technologies that facilitate efficient access to banking services,
human capital (Grohmann, Klühs, and Menkhoff 2018) socio-economic variables and financial and political
stability (Graff 2005). Hence, we specify the following econometric model:
FIit = λ0 +
2∑
c=1
λcDict + λ3Hit +
K∑
k=1
λk+3Zkit + μit (4)
where the dependent variable (FIit) represents the financial inclusion index of country i(i = 1, . . . ,N) at time
t, Dict is the extent of diffusion of technological innovation, Hit is a human capital indicator, Z1it , . . . ,ZKit are
control variables, including absence of corruption (Clausen, Kraay, and Nyiri 2011), government spending as a
Keynesian demand side factor, socio-economic and political factors identified by Graff (2005) andμi is an error
term.
We use two indicators of financial inclusion: the first is the percentage of respondents who report having an
account at a bank or another type of financial institution.5 This variable comes from theGlobal Findex database.6
This indicator is a direct measure of the access dimension of financial inclusion (see, Allen et al. 2016). The sec-
ond indicator is the overall financial development index and three of its sub-components (financial institutions
depth, financial institutions access, and financial institutions efficiency) proposed by Svirydzenka (2016).
3.3. Effects of fintech diffusion and financial inclusion on GDP per capita
The effects of financial inclusion and technology diffusion on living standards are captured by the following
specification of Equation (2),
yit = b0 + b1FIit +
2∑
c=1
bc+1Dict + b4Kit + b5Hit +
J∑
j=1
b6+jWjit + vit (5)
where yit is the log of per capita income of the country i(i = 1, . . . ,N), at time t, Hit is a human capi-
tal indicator, Kit is investment in fixed capital, and W1it , . . . ,WJit are controls, including population growth,
which may encourage greater investment (Becker, Glaeser, and Murphy 1999), composite stability, as a mea-
sure of socio-economic and political factors (Graff 2005), and a disturbance term, vit . In this specification,
the productivity parameter is captured by the extent of fintech diffusion (Dict) and the state of financial
inclusion (FIit).
4. Estimation results
Our empirical strategy is based on three steps. In the first step, we follow the existing literature that uses cross-
country regression for Equations (3)–(5). This enables us to have the widest country coverage and make use of
availablemeasures of financial inclusion that are not available for thewhole time period 1991–2015 (for example,
data for holding an account at a formal financial institution and using amobilemoney service cover only 3 years,
2011, 2014, 2017). In the second step, we estimate our three-equation model using 3-stage least squares to pick
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Table 1. Description of the variables and data sources.
Variables Definition Sources
Mobile phone Extent of diffusion – mobile subscriptions per 100 people WDI
Account Proportion of adult populationwith an account at a formal financial
institution
GFD
ATM Number of ATMs per 100,000 people WDI
Financial development index (FD) Overall index of financial development. It includes two categories
with three sub-indices in each category: financial institutions
(depth, access, efficiency) and financial market (depth, access,
efficiency).
Svirydzenka (2016)
Financial institutions depth (FID) A synthetic index composed of (i) Private sector credit to GDP, (ii)
Pension fund assets to GDP, (iii) Mutual fund assets to GDP, and
(iv) Insurance premiums (life+ non-life) to GDP.
Svirydzenka (2016)
Financial institutions access (FIA) A synthetic index builds by using number of bank branches and
number of ATM.
Svirydzenka (2016)
Financial institutions efficiency (FIE) A synthetic index composed of (i) Net interest margin, (ii) Lending-
deposits spread, (iii) Non-interest income to total income, (iv)
Overhead costs to total assets, (v) Return on assets, and (vi)
Return on equity.
Svirydzenka (2016)
GDP/N log of per capita income WDI
Human capital index The index proxies the average years of schooling PWT
Primary school Proportion of population who completed at least primary school WDI
Lower secondary school Proportion of population who completed at least lower secondary
school
WDI
Upper secondary school Proportion of population who completed at least upper secondary
school
WDI
Capital Log of the capital stock at constant 2011 national prices (in mil.
2011US$). The measure of capital that we use is cumulated
from series on investment in buildings and different types of
machinery (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015).
PWT
Population growth Growth rate of the population. WDI
Trade Trade (% of GDP). Average over the period 1990–2017 WDI
Government spending General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) WDI
Urbanisation Urban population (% of total) WDI
Absence of corruption This indicator assesses the degree of corruption within the political
system.
PRS
Composite stability It is a composite Political, Financial, Economic Risk Rating PRS
Political stability Assessment of the political stability of a country. PRS
Shadow Economy Estimation of the shadow economy (% of the GDP). It includes all
economic activities which are hidden from official authorities
for monetary, regulatory, and institutional reasons
Medina and Schneider (2018)
FDI inflow in ICT/Investment FDI inflow in ICT sector divided by total investment. Investment is
measured by the total gross fixed capital formation
FT and WDI
Legal origin UK Dummy variable: British legal origin La Porta et al. (1998)
Note: This table presents the dependent variables and the explanatory variables thatwe used in the paper, their definitions the abbreviations used
in empirical results, and sources of observed data. WDI stands for World Development Indicators, PWT is Penn World Table (PWT), GFD stands
for Global Findex database, FT is Financial Times and PRS stands for Political Risk Service Group.
up simultaneities between fintech diffusion, financial inclusion and GDP per capita. For the analysis in steps
one and two, we capture time effects by taking the average of existing variables from 2013 to the latest available
observation. Therefore, in Table 2, the number of observations equals the number of countries. At step three,
we complement the cross section analysis by estimating an error correction model using panel data regression
– this enables us to isolate short run and long-run effects of fintech diffusion and financial inclusion.
To explore the effects of fintech diffusion we sought to construct a panel dataset for the widest coverage of
countries and longest time period available. The financial inclusion indices are from Svirydzenka (2016) and
cover the period 1991–2015. Data were available for a total of 137 countries as listed in Appendix 2. The choice
and the construction of the main variables builds on those used in previous studies on financial innovation (see,
e.g. Laeven, Levine, and Michalopoulos 2015) and financial inclusion (e.g. Allen et al. 2016) and its impact on
growth (e.g. Kim, Yu, andHassan 2018). Table 1 lists the variables used, their abbreviated names, their definitions
and the sources of data.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP/N (log) 137 8.84 1.47 5.64 12.02
Account 125 0.59 0.29 0.07 1.00
ATM per capita 132 0.42 0.38 0.00 1.88
Mobile phone per capita 137 1.09 0.33 0.29 1.97
Trade 133 0.89 0.54 0.25 3.95
Government spending 132 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.36
Primary school 125 0.76 0.26 0.08 1
Lower secondary school 136 0.62 0.29 0.06 1
Upper secondary school 133 0.48 0.27 0.03 0.92
Human capital index 118 2.64 0.68 1.18 3.72
Population growth 137 1.30 1.29 −2.23 5.83
Urbanisation 137 0.61 0.23 0.12 1
Number of bank branches 130 0.19 0.22 0.01 2.04
Capital 131 12.92 1.96 8.48 17.81
FDI inflow in ICT/Investment 125 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.23
Shadow economy rate 130 0.27 0.12 0.07 0.65
Absence of corruption 115 2.82 1.21 1.00 5.50
Political risk 115 0.66 0.12 0.38 0.88
Composite risk 115 0.70 0.09 0.42 0.891
Financial development index (FD) 129 0.37 0.23 0.05 0.93
Financial institutions depth (FID) 129 0.33 0.28 0.02 1
Financial institutions access (FIA) 129 0.41 0.27 0.01 1
Financial institutions efficiency (FIE) 129 0.68 0.14 0.25 0.90
Note: This table presents the summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables used in this paper. Std. Dev. is the standard deviation
of each variable for a panel of 137 countries for 2013–2017.Mean,Min andMax are the average, theminimumand themaximumof each variable
in our sample. Obs. is the number of countries. The variables are defined in Table 1.
4.1. Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study are shown in Table 2. On average, 59% of the popu-
lation has an account at a formal financial institution. This proportion varies from 7% in Niger and Burundi to
almost 100% in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand and Sweden. Over
the last five years, the average penetration rate of mobile phone was 109% and varies from 28.72% (Cuba) to
197% (United Arab Emirates). The ATM penetration rate is very low compared to that of the mobile phone. It
varies from 0.14 per 100,000 inhabitants in Ethiopia to 188 per 100,000 inhabitants in Korea.
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix. Per capita income is highly and positively correlated with stability
indicators (composite or global and political stability), human capital variables (human capital index, primary
and secondary school) and financial inclusion – proxied by having an account (correlation greater than 0.7).
Financial inclusion – measured by ‘having an account’ and the financial development index and its sub-
indices – is also positively correlated with human capital variables and stability indices.
Fintech diffusion (ATM and digital networks, andmobile phones and payments) is positively correlated with
the proportion of the population leaving the urban area, GDP per capita, stability indices and human capital
variables. There is also a positive correlation between financial inclusion and fintech diffusion. These prelimi-
nary results indicate that fintech diffusion, financial inclusion, and economic performance are inter-related. We
take these inter-relations into account by estimating our three equations as a system in step two of our empir-
ical analysis. The correlation matrix shows that some variables are highly correlated (correlation greater than
0.7). These variables are therefore not included in the regressions at the same time to limit multicollinearity
issues.
4.2. Diffusion of technological innovation across countries: cross section analysis
We first focus on mobile phone and ATM technologies and estimate Equation (3). The main results of the esti-











Table 3. Correlation matrix.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Mobile phone (1) 1
ATM (2) 0.41∗∗∗ 1
Urbanisation (3) 0.48∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 1
Trade (4) 0.34∗∗∗ 0.12 0.21∗∗ 1
GDP/N (5) 0.57∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 1
Political stability (6) 0.52∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 1
Composite stability (7) 0.55∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 1
Primary school (8) 0.49∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 1
Lower sec. school (9) 0.47∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 1
Upper sec. school (10) 0.45∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 1
Human (11) 0.51∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 1
FDI ICT/Investment (12) −0.18∗∗ −0.19∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ 0.09 −0.28∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.08 −0.27∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.23∗∗ 1
Account (13) 0.55∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ 1
FD (14) 0.43∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 1
No. of bank branches (15) 0.21∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.11 0.36∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ −0.13 0.34∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 1
Note: This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between dependent and explanatory variables. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 4. Determinants of the diffusion of mobile phone and ATMs.
Mobile Phone ATM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP/N 0.120∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.021) (0.025)
Trade 0.095∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.073∗
(0.046) (0.041) (0.038)
Urbanisation 0.544∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗ 0.197
(0.129) (0.142) (0.109) (0.122)
Account 0.595∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.130 0.534∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.096) (0.110) (0.136) (0.114) (0.137)
Upper 0.321∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
secondary school (0.095) (0.104)
Bank branches 0.212 0.183 0.188 0.157
(0.189) (0.148) (0.153) (0.139)
Constant −0.044 0.754∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ −1.158∗∗∗ −0.657∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.056) (0.067) (0.073) (0.150) (0.161) (0.049) (0.052)
Observations 133 125 124 114 130 123 123 113
Adj. R2 0.361 0.300 0.398 0.423 0.504 0.537 0.526 0.525
Note: This table reports the OLS estimation results of Equation (1). The dependent variables are the number of mobile phone subscription per




First, we find that a high level of income per capita is associated with a high level of mobile phone adop-
tion. This is consistent with the literature which finds that the likelihood of having a mobile phone is positively
associated with economic development (Buys et al. 2009). Second, the higher the proportion of the population
that is financially included, the higher the diffusion of mobile phones. Third, composite stability (comprising
political, economic and financial stability) tends to enhance the diffusion of innovation. Fourth, a low level of
urbanisation decreases the diffusion of innovation.
Focusing on the diffusion of ATMs, the results indicate that GDP per capita and financial inclusion (mea-
sured by having an account at a formal institution) are determinants of the diffusion of ATMs. As in the case
of mobile phones, the level of urbanisation is also an important determinant of ATM diffusion, as are human
capital variables. The number of bank branches does not seem to affect the number of ATMs. This may be due
to the sample period (2013–2017). In most countries, the number of ATMs is not necessarily correlated with the
number of bank branches since ATMs can be found in train and gas stations, airports, supermarkets, etc.
Fifth, the results indicate that trade is a vehicle for technology diffusion. Our result is consistent with the
existing literature which shows that the diffusion of new technologies across countries may take place through
international trade in intermediate goods (Eaton and Kortum 1999, 2002; Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991).
Finally, we analyse the effect of human capital on fintech diffusion. We find that human capital variables (the
human capital index, primary and secondary school) are positively and significantly related to the diffusion of
technology. This last result indicates that learning and absorptive capacity, captured by human capital, are drivers
of technological diffusion. The development of human capital – through education – facilitates the adoption of
new technology.
4.3. Financial inclusion and the diffusion of technological innovation
We estimate Equation (4) to understand the determinants of financial inclusion. The results of the estimates
are reported in Table 5. Firstly, as expected, GDP per capita and government spending are positively associated
with the access to an account at a formal financial institution as demand for financial services from previously
unbanked customers increases as incomes rise, and government transfers and expenditure on services, such as,
education further stimulate awareness of, and new demand for, financial services.
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Table 5. Determinants of having an account at a financial institution.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shadow −1.238∗∗∗ −0.376∗∗ −0.567∗∗ −0.595∗∗∗ −0.847∗∗∗ −0.795∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.148) (0.232) (0.185) (0.145) (0.167)
Bank branches 0.187 0.013 0.056 0.056 0.031 0.070
(0.182) (0.080) (0.097) (0.096) (0.083) (0.102)
Government spending 0.834∗∗ 0.362∗ 0.508 0.733∗∗ 0.525∗ 0.511
(0.420) (0.213) (0.341) (0.335) (0.268) (0.316)
Mobile phone 0.298∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.090∗ 0.090∗ 0.097∗∗
(0.055) (0.048) (0.052) (0.049) (0.048)
ATM 0.130∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.044) (0.046) (0.048) (0.052)
GDP/N 0.126∗∗∗
(0.014)






Human capital index 0.135∗∗∗
(0.030)
Constant 0.423∗∗∗ −0.531∗∗∗ 0.198 −0.307 0.265∗∗∗ 0.168
(0.105) (0.150) (0.135) (0.225) (0.080) (0.119)
Observations 120 120 106 106 110 111
Adj. R2 0.593 0.804 0.714 0.724 0.746 0.730
Note: This table reports the OLS estimation results of Equation (2). The dependent variable is financial inclusion measured by having an account




Secondly, the size of the shadow economy impairs financial inclusion. By definition, ‘the shadow economy
includes all economic activities which are hidden from official authorities for monetary (avoid taxes payment),
regulatory (avoid governmental bureaucracy or the burden of regulatory framework), and institutional reasons’
(Medina and Schneider 2018). High levels of shadow economy activity involve financial transactions outside the
formal financial system. Thirdly, on average, the technology diffusion (mobile phone and ATM) boosts finan-
cial inclusion, i.e. increases the proportion of the population financially included in the formal system. Fourthly,
we find that financial inclusion is positively associated with political and composite stability and good gover-
nance (absence of corruption). The political and global environment (stability and governance) spur financial
inclusion as in Allen et al. (2014). Fifthly, human capital is also a determinant of financial inclusion. Increases
in the human capital index or primary, lower and upper secondary educational attainment increase the level
of financial inclusion in the economy probability through financial literacy (Grohmann, Klühs, and Menkhoff
2018).
4.4. The impact of fintech diffusion and financial inclusion on income per capita
In order to assess the effects of fintech diffusion on living standards, we estimate Equation (5). The dependent
variable is the log of per capita income. Column (1) of Table 6 reports the estimates of Equation (3) by consid-
ering only three inputs (human capital, physical capital and labour) in a production function. In column (2), we
add the financial inclusion variable. Financial inclusion positively contributes to income per capita. In columns
(3) and (4), we add two fintech diffusion variables and show that the diffusion of technology increases living
standards.
This analysis shows that, in addition to traditional factors entering the production function (human capital
and physical capital), financial inclusion, technology diffusion and stability are key factors that can increase
per capita income. At the same time, GDP per capita is positively associated with financial inclusion and the
diffusion of innovation. The results remain significant after controlling for other factors.
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Table 6. The determinants of income per capita.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Human capital index 1.644∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗ 1.370∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.164) (0.161) (0.191) (0.156) (0.139) (0.154)
Capital 0.196∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.082∗∗
(0.049) (0.035) (0.042) (0.048) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039)
Population growth 0.122 0.162∗∗ 0.169∗ 0.141 0.194∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.132∗
(0.106) (0.076) (0.086) (0.094) (0.068) (0.069) (0.077)
ATM 0.943∗∗ 0.199 0.178 0.146
(0.363) (0.217) (0.167) (0.196)
Account 3.043∗∗∗ 2.702∗∗∗ 1.814∗∗∗ 1.865∗∗∗
(0.380) (0.397) (0.406) (0.442)
Mobile phone 1.425∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.215) (0.218) (0.226)




Constant 1.771∗∗∗ 3.146∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗ 2.919∗∗∗ 2.787∗∗∗ 2.856∗∗∗ 1.347
(0.651) (0.511) (0.501) (0.746) (0.515) (0.567) (0.888)
Observations 118 115 118 118 115 105 105
Adj. R2 0.667 0.830 0.730 0.692 0.855 0.868 0.864
Note: This table presents ordinary least squares OLS estimates of Equation (3). The dependent variable is log of the per capita income. Robust




To gauge the robustness of our findingswe extend the analysis by 3-stage least squares to capture simultaneous
effects between our three variables – fintech diffusion, financial inclusion and GDP per capita and panel data
regressions to distinguish short run and long run effects.
4.5. Systems estimation of fintech diffusion, financial inclusion andGDP per capita
Previously, we found that fintech diffusion can be partly explained by financial inclusion. In addition, fintech
diffusion explains financial inclusion and GDP per capita. Moreover, greater financial inclusion also leads to a
high level of per capita income. Therefore, all three variables are jointly determined and the estimates attained
may be biased. To address this issue of reverse causality, we use three-stage least squares (3SLS) to estimate a
series of systems of three equations.7
Table 7 reports the results of the estimates. We estimate two different systems of equations. In the first system
(Equations (1)–(3)) of Table 7, the variables: mobile phone penetration rate, ATM penetration rate, having an
account, GDP per capita and the composite stability index are considered as endogenous.
Before interpreting the results, we discuss the identification of the systems of equations and provide the
appropriate diagnostic statistics for this purpose. First, the systems are overidentified. There are five endoge-
nous variables (mobile phone penetration rate, ATM penetration rate, having an account, GDP per capita and
the composite stability index) in the first system and six endogenous variables (mobile phone penetration rate,
ATM penetration rate, having an account, GDP per capita, human capital index, and stock of capital) in the
second system. In terms of exogenous variables, there are eight exogenous variables in the first system and six
in the second system. In addition, we use the political stability index as an instrument in the ATM equation
(the correlation between the ATM penetration rate and the political stability index is 0.61). Moreover, the abso-
lute latitude of each country is used as instrument in the second system of equations. Therefore, the number of
exogenous variables (including instruments) is greater than the number of endogenous variables in each system.
Second, the Hansen J statistic is calculated to determine the validity of the overidentifying restrictions because
the system is overidentified.8 The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid. The p-value
associated withHansen’s J statistic should be greater than 0.10 in all cases for the null hypothesis to be accepted
and the system to be overidentified. The last row of the Table 7 reports theHansen’s J statistic and the associated
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Table 7. Results of the 3SLS estimations of the system of Equations (1)–(3).
Mobile phone Account GDP/N Mobile phone Account GDP/N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mobile phone 0.336∗∗ 3.244∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 3.429∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.525) (0.177) (0.749)
ATM 0.451∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗
(0.110) (0.166)
Account 1.554∗∗ 0.370∗∗ 1.519∗∗
(0.679) (0.154) (0.764)
Shadow economy rate −0.572∗∗∗ −0.507∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.181)
Bank branches −0.017 0.006
(0.076) (0.071)














Constant 0.402∗∗∗ 0.108 0.386 0.578∗∗∗ −0.034 −0.071
(0.093) (0.162) (1.120) (0.069) (0.168) (1.041)
Observations 101 101 101 111 111 111
R-squared 0.419 0.610 0.676 0.381 0.582 0.672
Hansen Statistics (p-value) 16.566(0.167) 12.656(0.124)
Note: This table presents 3SLS estimates of the system of Equations (1)–(3). In the first system (models (1)–(3)), mobile phone penetration rate,
ATM penetration rate, having an account, GDP per capita and composite stability index are considered as endogenous. Political stability index is
used as instrument in addition to the other exogenous variables of the system. In the second system (models (4)–(6)), mobile phone penetration
rate, ATMpenetration rate, having an account, GDPper capita, human capital index, and stock of capital are considered as endogenous. Absolute




p-value. There is no evidence against the null of overidentifying restriction hypothesis at 10% level. Finally, we
provide evidence for limited risk of weak instruments in the two systems by using the F-statistics calculated
after the first stage of the estimation. All F-statistics are greater than 10 (see footnote 8), except the first stage
estimation of the mobile phone penetration rate for which this statistic is 9.15. These results indicate that the
system is identified and the following paragraphs discuss the main findings.
Fintech diffusion and financial inclusion are two significant determinants of income per capita consistent
with our previous findings. Columns (1)–(3) show that the diffusion of innovation enhances financial inclusion
and, ultimately GDP per capita through financial inclusion. The second system of equations (columns (4)–(6))
shows the feedback effects from financial inclusion to fintech diffusion (including network externalities) and
economic prosperity.
Overall, these new findings do not invalidate our previous results. This indicates limited endogeneity bias in
our previous findings.
4.5.1. Panel estimation for up to 137 countries from 1991–2015
In the previous sections, we use cross-section analysis. Therefore, it was not possible to account for country-
specific effects nor time dynamics. The main reason why we use cross-section analysis is that the measure of
financial inclusion is available only in 2011, 2014 and 2017. To overcome this limitation, we use the financial
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development database by Svirydzenka (2016). This dataset runs from 1980 to 2015 and covers 137 countries.9
We restrict our analysis to the period 1991–2015 because data on the shadow economy are not available for
later years. We use four indicators to proxy financial inclusion from the financial development database: the
financial development index (FD), financial institutions depth (FID), financial institutions access (FIA) and
financial institutions efficiency (FIE). Table C1 reports descriptive statistics and Table C2 provides the matrix of
Pearson’s correlation coefficients. Stationarity tests were carried out and Table C3 reports panel unit root tests.
We find that the dependent variables (except for FD and FIE) are integrated of order one, as are some explanatory
variables. This opens up the possibility for cointegration analysis. We perform the Kao (1999), Pedroni (1999,
2004), andWesterlund (2005) tests of cointegration on our panel dataset and the presence of cointegration is not
rejected.10 We therefore estimate a dynamic panel model using a dynamic fixed effects technique. The general
form of the error-correction equation estimated is,11










γkXk,i,t + εit (6)
where  denotes the first difference operator, git is the dependent variable (diffusion of innovation or finan-
cial inclusion or GDP per capita), X1it , . . . ,XKit is a set of control variables, φ is the error-correcting speed of
adjustment term, αi are country-fixed effects and εit is an error term. If φ = 0, there is no evidence of a long-run
relationship. If this parameter, which should lie between 0 and −1 for stability, is significant, then the results
provide confirmation of a stable long-run relationship.
In what follows, we report the error correction term (φ) and the long-run parameters (θ1, . . . , θK) for our
different models that are estimated using dynamic fixed effects.
4.6. Fintech diffusion
Equation (3) is estimated using the extent ofATMandmobile phone diffusion as dependent variables. The results
of the estimates are reported in Tables 8 and 9. The error correction terms are negative and significant at the 1%
level in almost all the estimates, except three (columns 5, 6 and 7 of Table 9). This provides evidence of long-run
relationships between fintech diffusion, financial inclusion and GDP per capita and the control variables used
in the regressions.
More specifically, we find that GDP per capita, urbanisation, trade and financial inclusion – measured by
financial development index – are robust determinants of the diffusion of mobile phone technology (Table 8).
Financial institutional efficiency and, to a lesser extent, financial institutional depth are two critical aspects
of financial inclusion that affect the adoption of mobile phone technology. Other important determinants are
human capital (measured by human capital index), political and composite stability and FDI inflow in the ICT
sector.
Analysis of ATM diffusion shows that financial institution depth is a determinant of ATMs diffusion (at the
10% level). GDP per capita and measures of stability are also determinants of the diffusion of ATMs (Table 9).
The results are consistent with our previous findings based on cross-sectional analysis. In addition, they provide
evidence of the long-run effects of fintech diffusion and financial inclusion on GDP per capita.
To test for possibility of different slopes for developed and developing countries, countries are classified
into low (low to lower-middle) and high (upper-middle and high) income groups. We run the regressions for
these two groups and compare the error correction terms by using the following statistics (see Equation (4) in
Paternoster et al. (1998)):
Z = ec1 − ec2√
(se(ec1)2 + (se(ec2)2
We find12 that the error correction terms are significantly different at the 5% level between the two groups for the
diffusion of mobile phone but not after controlling for composite stability and changing themeasure of financial
inclusion. Regarding the diffusion of ATMs, generally, we find no significant difference between the speed of
adjustment to long-run equilibrium between the two groups.
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Table 8. Determinants of mobile phone diffusion (long-run relationships).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8)
Financial 2.693∗∗∗ 3.014∗∗∗ 2.250∗∗∗ 0.815∗







GDP/N 0.651∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.088) (0.092) (0.075) (0.065) (0.093) (0.076)
Trade 0.350∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗ 0.299∗ −0.063 0.456∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.166) (0.165) (0.158) (0.175) (0.192) (0.181)
Urbanisation 4.245∗∗∗ 5.866∗∗∗ 3.706∗∗ 2.437∗ 5.339∗∗∗ 5.828∗∗∗ 6.246∗∗∗







Error correction term −0.082∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.206∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.022) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 3,144 2,779 2,832 1,121 3,144 3,144 3,144
Note: This table reports the dynamic fixed effects estimation results of Equation (4). The dependent variable is mobile phone subscription per




Table 9. Determinants of mobile ATM diffusion (long-run relationships).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP/N 0.356∗∗ 0.363∗∗ 0.313∗∗ 0.321∗∗ 0.278∗ 0.250∗ 0.305∗
(0.146) (0.164) (0.132) (0.148) (0.152) (0.140) (0.183)
urbanisation −1.823 −1.547 −2.223 −1.964 −3.967 −3.112 −2.414
(1.562) (1.603) (1.660) (1.689) (4.536) (3.595) (3.629)
Number of bank branches 0.236 0.289 0.251 0.311 0.117 0.094 0.121
(0.233) (0.265) (0.247) (0.280) (0.123) (0.110) (0.126)
Financial depth index 0.917∗ 0.979∗ 1.417
(0.476) (0.508) (1.352)
Financial efficiency index 0.297 0.283 1.223 1.254
(0.426) (0.434) (1.174) (1.353)
Political stability 1.672∗∗ 1.751∗
(0.848) (0.949)
Composite stability 1.180∗ 1.105
(0.700) (0.759)
Lower secondary school −0.098 −0.015
(0.652) (0.548)
Upper secondary school −0.649
(0.576)
Error correction term −0.106∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.165∗ −0.168∗ −0.147∗
(0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.095) (0.090) (0.089)
Observations 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 424 424 451
Note: This table reports the dynamic fixed effects estimation results of Equation (4). The dependent variable is number of ATM per inhabitant.
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We further explore the possibility that fintech diffusion is a function of positive externalities by testing a
non-linear relationship between financial inclusion and technology diffusion. Firstly, we regress the diffusion of
mobile phones and ATMs on the natural log of the financial development index and find a positive relationship.
Secondly, we use the square of financial inclusion and find a U-shaped relationship only for the diffusion of
mobile phone and financial inclusion. This second result indicates that financial inclusion drives the diffusion
of mobile phones up to a certain threshold above which its contribution declines slightly.
Finally, we consider the possibility that the degree of industrialisation and the level of competition in the
banking sector might affect fintech diffusion. Therefore, in addition to the urbanisation variable, we control for
the share of the industrial sector inGDP (as a proxy of the level of industrial development) and the concentration
of the banking sector measured by the share of the three largest banks (a proxy of competition). We find that
these variables are not significantly related to the diffusion of ATMs.
4.7. Financial inclusion
To analyse the determinants of financial inclusion, we estimate Equation (4) using financial institutional depth
and access to financial institutions as dependent variables. The results are reported in Table 10. Mobile phone
diffusion, the size of the shadow economy and government spending are critical determinants of financial insti-
tutional depth. Human capital –measured by a human capital index – and composite stability are also important
for the deepening of the financial institutions, and thus inclusion. It is worth noting that the depth of financial
institutions is higher in countries where the level of the informal economy is low (a lower value of the shadow
economy rate). These findings are consistent with our cross section results, but again they provide additional
evidence of the long run relationships between financial inclusion, GDP per capital and fintech diffusion.
The analysis of the access dimension of financial inclusion shows that GDP per capita and the size of the
informal sector are two main determinants of financial inclusion. Again, a high level of informal economy is
associated with a low level of access to financial institutions – measured by the number of bank branches and
ATMs. Conversely, higher GDP per capita stimulates access to financial institutions.
Although we find that the diffusion of mobile phones is related to financial inclusion, one important question
is the effectiveness of ICT diffusion, that is the number of years of ICT adoption a country needs before there are
sustained effects on financial inclusion. To answer this question, we plot the diffusion curve of mobile phones,
that is the average mobile phone penetration rate per year (see Figure C1).We also plot the relationship between
financial inclusion and the mobile phone penetration rate to obtain the average mobile phone penetration rate
at the consolidation point (Figure C2). Based on this information, we estimate the effectiveness of the diffusion
Table 10. Determinants of financial institutional depth and access.
Financial institutions depth Financial institutions access
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mobile phone 0.062∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.059 0.076 −0.170
(0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.052) (0.062) (0.192)
GDP/N 0.045∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.045)
Shadow rate −0.299∗∗ −0.212∗∗ 0.054 −0.145 −0.762 −1.932∗∗∗ −1.290 −5.217∗
(0.117) (0.087) (0.128) (0.090) (0.554) (0.695) (0.872) (3.152)
Government 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.055
Spending (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.041)




Human capital index 0.122∗∗∗ −0.077
(0.040) (0.441)
Error correction term −0.151∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.039)
Observations 3,067 2,779 3,067 2,832 3,067 2,779 3,067 2,832
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High income 44 10 0.9% in 1990
Upper-middle income 83 12 1% in 1996
Lower-middle income 43 8 1% in 1999
Low income 30 7 0.9% in 2001
Table 12. Determinants of GDP/N (long-run relationships).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Human capital index 1.292∗∗∗ 0.275 1.886∗∗∗ 1.233∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗ 2.073∗∗∗ 1.186∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗
(0.297) (0.171) (0.310) (0.289) (0.282) (0.323) (0.272) (0.284)
Capital 0.148 0.342∗∗ 0.343∗∗ 0.186 0.210 0.350∗∗ 0.187 0.195
(0.149) (0.167) (0.147) (0.141) (0.153) (0.164) (0.143) (0.162)
Population growth −0.036 −0.013 −0.034 −0.032 −0.044 −0.032 −0.026 −0.046
(0.035) (0.012) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) (0.041) (0.033) (0.032)
Mobile phone 0.505∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.074) (0.089) (0.082) (0.080) (0.082)
ATM 0.164∗
(0.096)
Financial access index 1.258∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗ 0.556∗∗
(0.296) (0.309) (0.282)
Financial efficiency 1.206∗∗ 0.954∗∗ 0.345
Index (0.503) (0.405) (0.390)
Composite stability 4.354∗∗∗ 4.394∗∗∗
(0.863) (0.811)
Error correction term −0.169∗∗∗ −0.446∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.031) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.018)
Observations 2,832 1,304 2,832 2,832 2,779 2,832 2,832 2,779





of mobile phones to be 7 years for low income countries, 8 years for lower-middle income countries, 10 years for
high income countries and 12 years for upper-middle income countries using references dates (Table 11). This is
consistent with the well-known finding that lower income countries can benefit more quickly from technology
diffusion and catch-up.
4.8. GDP per capita
Finally, we estimate Equation (5) using per capita income. Table 12 reports the estimates. Fintech diffusion
(mobile phones and ATMs) is positively associated with per capita income, indicating the long-run impact of
diffusion on income per capita. Regarding financial inclusion, the results show that financial institutions access
and efficiency play an important role, while there is no effect (at conventional significant levels) of the depth
dimension on GDP per capita. Composite stability and human capital, however, do also determine income per
capita in the long run.
5. Conclusion
The widespread diffusion of ATMs and the associated development of global inter-bank digital networks and
markets (Batiz-Lazo 2018) has transformed financial services over the past 25 years or so. Similarly, mobile
phone technology linked with mobile payments systems and digital financial networks is transforming the way
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banking services are provided across the globe. Despite this transformation, relatively little research has been
conducted on the impact of the widespread diffusion of fintech.
Theoretically, the diffusion of new technology in the financial services sector has the potential to enhance
financial inclusion and raise living standards in the wider economy. This paper has focused on two possible
transmission mechanisms (the fintech diffusion channel and the financial inclusion channel) the interactions
between them, and their impact on income per capita. The existence of positive network externalities means
that financial inclusion increases the utility of networked financial services, such as, ATMs and mobile money
and payments.
Our empirical analysis is based on cross section estimations for up to 137 countries (using the average value of
each variable for 2013–2017) and panel data analysis using an error correction model for the period 1991–2015.
The cross section estimations show that the extent of fintech diffusion increases with financial inclusion, human
capital and GDP per capita. This last result suggests that financial sector development is partly driven by activity
in the real economy. We also find that the extent of fintech diffusion (ATMs and mobile phones and payments
systems) increases financial inclusion. In addition, our cross section results show thatGDPper capita is increased
by investment in fixed and human capital, the diffusion of ATMs and mobile phones, as well as socio-economic
variables, such as absence of corruption and composite stability (political, economic and financial risk). In light
of evidence of endogeneity, we estimate our 3 equations as a system using three stage least squares. The main
results are preserved in nature, with limited endogeneity bias.
Due to the fact that the technology diffusion is a long-run process, and because many of the variables in
our panel data set are non-stationary, the panel estimations are conducted using an error correction model
with country fixed effects. These results provide evidence of long-run relationships between fintech, financial
inclusion and income per capita.
The main findings in this paper open up new avenues for policy and future research. Most govern-
ments target living standards as a policy variable. More recently, financial inclusion has also been adopted
as a target by policy makers. Our results suggest that fintech diffusion has positive effects on both GDP
per capita and financial inclusion, and that financial inclusion also drives fintech diffusion and raises GDP
per capita. The positive impact of fintech diffusion and its relationship with financial inclusion suggests
that governments should look at a wider set of policy variables to increase the performance of the finan-
cial sector. In addition to standard policies to reduce corruption, promote political stability, contain eco-
nomic and financial risks and control shadow banking activities, government policies should also be designed
to enhance the extent of fintech diffusion. Potential policy instruments include: standard setting (partic-
ularly in ICT, digital networks and security protocols that can enhance network externalities and inter-
operability), infrastructure development (including fibre optic cable, telecommunications networks that give
greater access to financial services and the development of mobile payments systems) and education and
training in fintech adoption and use, as a means of leveraging financial inclusion and higher GDP per
capita.
The present study has focused on two – albeit pervasive – fintech technologies. Both utilise ICT, digital net-
works, security protocols and inter-bank operability. There is clearly scope for future research to look at the
diffusion of other financial technologies to ascertain their effects on key policy targets such as financial inclusion
and GDP per capita.
Notes
1. See Batiz-Lazo (2009, 2018), Konheim (2016), Hall andKahn (2003), and Scott, Van Reenen, and Zachariadis (2017) for analysis
of the introduction and diffusion of ATMs and digital networks; Frame andWhite 2012 for an overview of financial innovations
and their diffusion; and Lashitew, van Tulder, and Liasses (2019) on the diffusion of mobile phones, money and payments
technology.
2. The Financial Stability Board (2019, 1) defines fintech as, ‘technology-enabled innovation in financial services that could result
in new business models, applications, processes or products with an associated material effect on the provision of financial
services.’ Leong and Sung (2018, 75) use a similar definition and identify three stages of fintech development – FintechMark 1.0
involved the development of enabling technologies that ‘breed related products of financial technology’ reflecting the ‘platform
technology’ nature of ATMs, digital networks and security protocols.
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3. Madsen and Ang’s study provides valuable analysis of the impact of research and development (R&D) on ideas production
or invention for 20 OECD countries. However, the measures they use for the knowledge stock and R&D do not fully capture
for R&D in financial services as until recently the collection of data via Business R&D surveys did not cover the financial
intermediation sector and the proportion of financial innovations that is patented is low (Dal Borgo et al. 2013).
4. The distinction between invention (or ‘ideas’ production) and diffusion is captured by the ‘paradox of patents’ (Robinson 1956),
i.e. that patents are designed to spur invention by slowing down the rate of diffusion (Rosenberg 1972; MacLeod 1991). Inven-
tion and innovation are also distinct; inventions only become innovations when diffusion begins, i.e. an invention becomes an
innovation when it starts to be utilised in the economy by firms, consumers or government (OECD, Oslo Manual, 2005).
5. Another indicator used in the literature is the percentage of respondents who report personally using a mobile money service
in the 12 months preceding the survey (see, Allen et al. 2016). We did not use this indicator due to the limited coverage of this
indicator in our dataset.
6. It may be argued that survey respondents are educated people who, on average, have higher income. Thus, using the percentage
of respondents who report having an account at a bank or another type of financial institution as indicator of financial inclusion
might be biased. However, the Global Findex database is drawn from nationally representative samples using random selection
techniques. The target population is the entire civilian, non-institutionalised population age 15 and above without targeting the
level of education. Respondents are randomly selectedwithin eligible households by following the Kish grid (eligible households
are selected using random technique as well).At present, this is the best source to assess the proportion of the population with
a bank account because it is based on the demand side and not collected from suppliers. In developing countries, financial
inclusion measured on the supply side is biased due to duplication of the number of bank accounts (the same person has
multiple bank accounts in different financial institutions).
7. For a system to be identified, the number of exogenous variables in all the equations, including the instruments (any additional
variables), minus the number of exogenous variables in each equation of the systemmust be greater than or equal to the number
of endogenous variables. In other words, there must be at least as many noncollinear exogenous variables in the remaining
system as there are endogenous right-hand-side variables in an equation. When the number of exogenous variables is greater
than the number of endogenous variables, the system is overidentified and we use the Hansen’s J statistic to determine the
validity of the overidentifying restrictions. Tests of overidentifying restrictions test whether: (i) the instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term; and (ii) the equation is mis-specified and one or more of the excluded exogenous variables should in fact be
included in the structural equation. The p-value associated with the Hansen’s J statistic should be greater than 0.10 in all cases.
In addition, the F-statistics calculated after the first stage of the estimation – and usually used to check whether the estimated
models are globally significant – is used to test the existence of weak instruments. These F-statistics are expected to be greater
than 10 (see Staiger and Stock 1997).
8. This is preferred to the Sargan test which is not robust to heteroskedasticity.
9. The maximum number of observations is 3,425, i.e. 137 countries over 25 years from 1991 to 2015, but there are missing
observations for some countries and years.
10. The results are available upon request from the authors.
11. This equation does not account for country heterogeneity in parameters. Country effects are captured only through the fixed
effects. This assumption can be strong, however, the results of the estimates do not invalidate our previous findings based on
cross-sectional analysis.
12. The results are available upon request from the authors.
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Appendix 1: Long definitions of some variables taken from PRS Group (2019) List of variables,
downloadable from: https://epub.prsgroup.com/list-of-all-variable-definitions
Political risk rating
‘A means of assessing the political stability of a country on a comparable basis with other countries by assessing risk points for each
of the component factors of government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external con-
flict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy
quality. Risk ratings range from a high of 100 (least risk) to a low of 0 (highest risk), though lowest de facto ratings generally range
in the 30s and 40s.’
Corruption
‘A measure of corruption within the political system that is a threat to foreign investment by distorting the economic and financial
environment, reducing the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patron-
age rather than ability, and introducing inherent instability into the political process. (Refer to ICRG Methodology for maximum
points for this variable, as well as for related formulas for calculating risk.)’
Appendix 2: list of countries
This table is sorted by region, income level and country name. EAP stands for Europe &Central Asia, LAC stands for Latin America
& Caribbean, MENA is Middle East & North Africa, NA stands for North America, SA is South Asia, SSA is Sub-Saharan Africa.
Table B1. List of the countries used in this paper.
Region Income Country Region Income Country
EAP High income Australia LAC Lower middle income Honduras
EAP High income Japan LAC Upper middle income Belize
EAP High income Korea, Rep. LAC Upper middle income Brazil
EAP High income New Zealand LAC Upper middle income Colombia
EAP High income Palau LAC Upper middle income Costa Rica
EAP High income Singapore LAC Upper middle income Cuba
EAP Lower middle income Cambodia LAC Upper middle income Dominican Republic
EAP Lower middle income Indonesia LAC Upper middle income Ecuador
EAP Lower middle income Mongolia LAC Upper middle income Guatemala
EAP Lower middle income Philippines LAC Upper middle income Guyana
EAP Lower middle income Vietnam LAC Upper middle income Jamaica
EAP Upper middle income China LAC Upper middle income Mexico
EAP Upper middle income Fiji LAC Upper middle income Paraguay
EAP Upper middle income Malaysia LAC Upper middle income Peru
EAP Upper middle income Thailand LAC Upper middle income Suriname
(continued)
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Table B1. Continued.
Region Income Country Region Income Country
EAP Upper middle income Tuvalu LAC Upper middle income Venezuela, RB
ECA High income Andorra MENA High income Israel
ECA High income Austria MENA High income Kuwait
ECA High income Belgium MENA High income Malta
ECA High income Croatia MENA High income Oman
ECA High income Cyprus MENA High income Qatar
ECA High income Czech Republic MENA High income Saudi Arabia
ECA High income Denmark MENA High income United Arab Emirates
ECA High income Estonia MENA Low income Syrian Arab Republic
ECA High income Finland MENA Lower middle income Tunisia
ECA High income France MENA Upper middle income Algeria
ECA High income Germany MENA Upper middle income Iran, Islamic Rep.
ECA High income Greece MENA Upper middle income Iraq
ECA High income Hungary MENA Upper middle income Jordan
ECA High income Iceland MENA Upper middle income Lebanon
ECA High income Ireland NA High income Canada
ECA High income Italy NA High income United States
ECA High income Latvia SA Low income Nepal
ECA High income Liechtenstein SA Lower middle income Bangladesh
ECA High income Lithuania SA Lower middle income Bhutan
ECA High income Luxembourg SA Lower middle income India
ECA High income Netherlands SA Lower middle income Pakistan
ECA High income Norway SA Lower middle income Sri Lanka
ECA High income Poland SA Upper middle income Maldives
ECA High income Portugal SSA Low income Benin
ECA High income Slovak Republic SSA Low income Burkina Faso
ECA High income Slovenia SSA Low income Burundi
ECA High income Spain SSA Low income Chad
ECA High income Sweden SSA Low income Congo, Dem. Rep.
ECA High income Switzerland SSA Low income Ethiopia
ECA High income United Kingdom SSA Low income Guinea
ECA Low income Tajikistan SSA Low income Malawi
ECA Lower middle income Georgia SSA Low income Mali
ECA Lower middle income Kyrgyz Republic SSA Low income Mozambique
ECA Lower middle income Moldova SSA Low income Niger
ECA Lower middle income Ukraine SSA Low income Rwanda
ECA Upper middle income Albania SSA Low income Senegal
ECA Upper middle income Armenia SSA Low income Tanzania
ECA Upper middle income Azerbaijan SSA Low income Togo
ECA Upper middle income Belarus SSA Low income Uganda
ECA Upper middle income Bosnia and Herzegovina SSA Low income Zimbabwe
ECA Upper middle income Bulgaria SSA Lower middle income Angola
Region Income Country Region Income Country
ECA Upper middle income Kazakhstan SSA Lower middle income Cabo Verde
ECA Upper middle income Montenegro SSA Lower middle income Cameroon
ECA Upper middle income Romania SSA Lower middle income Cote d’Ivoire
ECA Upper middle income Russian Federation SSA Lower middle income Ghana
ECA Upper middle income Turkey SSA Lower middle income Kenya
LAC High income Argentina SSA Lower middle income Lesotho
LAC High income Bahamas, The SSA Lower middle income Nigeria
LAC High income Chile SSA Lower middle income Zambia
LAC High income Trinidad and Tobago SSA Upper middle income Mauritius
LAC High income Uruguay SSA Upper middle income Namibia
LAC Lower middle income Bolivia SSA Upper middle income South Africa
LAC Lower middle income El Salvador
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Appendix 3: additional econometric evidence (panel data results)
The maximum number of observations is 3,425 – i.e. 137 countries over 25 years from 1991–2015 – there are missing observations
for some countries and years.
Table C1. Summary statistics (panel data).
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP/N 3,350 8.20 1.67 4.63 12.10
Financial Development index 3,225 0.33 0.23 0.00 1.00
Financial depth index 3,225 0.27 0.27 0.00 1.00
Financial access index 3,225 0.32 0.28 0.00 1.00
Financial efficiency index 3,225 0.63 0.18 0.00 0.96
Trade 3,167 0.83 0.50 0.00 4.42
Government spending 3,094 15.92 5.81 0.91 76.22
Human capital index 2,832 2.45 0.69 1.03 3.73
Primary school 629 0.81 0.20 0.05 1.00
Lower secondary school 715 0.65 0.26 0.02 1.00
Upper secondary school 721 0.53 0.25 0.00 0.96
Population growth 3,419 1.42 1.57 −6.18 16.33
Urbanisation 3,425 0.57 0.23 0.05 1.00
Density 3,404 4.15 1.37 0.36 8.96
ATM 1,437 0.38 0.38 0.00 1.88
Mobile phone 3,388 0.46 0.49 0.00 2.08
Number of bank branches 1,526 0.19 0.20 0.00 2.58
Capital 3,144 12.55 2.01 7.33 18.03
Shadow rate 3,250 0.31 0.13 0.06 0.72
Absence of corruption 2,793 2.98 1.31 0.00 6.00
Political stability 2,793 0.67 0.13 0.18 0.97
Composite stability 2,793 0.70 0.11 0.23 0.94
FDI inflow in ICT/Investment 1,295 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.34
FDI inflow in ICT/FDI 1,338 0.13 0.17 0.00 1.00
Employment agriculture 3,325 28.93 25.72 0.13 92.84










Table C2. Pearson correlation matrix.





Urbanisation 0.362∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 1
(3) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade 0.266∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 1
(4) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000)
GDP/N 0.581∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 1
(5) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Political stability 0.317∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 1
(6) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Composite stability 0.364∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 1
(7) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Primary 0.478∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 1
(8) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lower secondary 0.476∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗ 1
(9) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Upper secondary 0.470∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗
(10) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Human 0.476∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗
(11) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FDI ICT/Investment −0.136∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗ −0.203∗∗∗
(12) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
FDI ICT/FDI −0.002 0.030 −0.016 0.077∗∗∗ 0.044 0.049∗ 0.033 0.050 0.039
(13) (0.944) (0.304) (0.563) (0.005) (0.106) (0.084) (0.242) (0.262) (0.363)
Employment (agriculture) −0.441∗∗∗ −0.585∗∗∗ −0.833∗∗∗ −0.272∗∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.644∗∗∗ −0.675∗∗∗ −0.666∗∗∗ −0.577∗∗∗
(14) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Export Agriculture −0.137∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.048
(15) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.925) (0.211)
Financial Development 0.476∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(16) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial depth 0.382∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗
(17) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial Access 0.488∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗
(18) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial efficiency 0.365∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗


























FDI ICT/Investment −0.191∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ 1
(12) (0.000) (0.000)
FDI ICT/FDI 0.079∗ 0.019 0.507∗∗∗ 1
(13) (0.055) (0.529) (0.000)
Employment (agriculture) −0.554∗∗∗ −0.729∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ −0.002 1
(14) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.932)
Export Agriculture 0.032 −0.196∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 1
(15) (0.395) (0.000) (0.005) (0.025) (0.000)
Financial Development 0.454∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ −0.668∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ 1
(16) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial depth 0.432∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ −0.605∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ 1
(17) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial Access 0.448∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ 0.031 −0.687∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 1
(18) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.259) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial efficiency 0.316∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ 0.018 −0.423∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 1
(19) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.524) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: This table presents the results of unit root tests. The null of all test is ‘all panels contain unit roots’. Fisher-Type statistics are the Inverse normal distribution of the Dickey Fuller test. The lag length
is selected based on Akaike Information Criteria for Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) test. Other statistics are based on two lags except for ATM for which the statistics are based on the first lag. P-values are
in parentheses. The decision is heavily based on Maddala and Wu (1999) or Pesaran (2007) when these statistics are available. Blank cells indicate that we are not able to compute statistics due to
insufficient number of observations for some countries of the panel.
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Figure C1. (Average) mobile phone diffusion curve.




















Table C3. Unit root tests.
Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) Fisher-type (Choi 2001) Maddala and Wu (1999) Pesaran (2007) Decision
without trend with trend without trend with trend without trend with trend without trend with trend
Mobile phone 17.79(1.00) 7.22(1.00) 0.52(0.70) 8.45(1.00) 129.24(1.00) 154.48(1.00) 1.91(0.97) 6.59(1.00) I(1)
ATM 2.39(0.99) 4.70(1.00) I(1)
GDP/N 7.95(1.00) 1.31(0.91) 0.00(0.50) 0.49(0.69) 121.05(1.00) 212.69(0.98) −7.79(0.00) −3.24(0.00) I(1)
Density 13.20(1.00) −36.32(0.00) 9.38(1.00) 2.39(0.99) 1,157.57(0.00) 724.12(0.00) 7.38(1.00) 7.65(1.00) I(1)
Shadow 6.98(1.00) −5.86(0.00) 1.63(0.95) −1.28(0.10) 176.64(1.00) 305.34(0.02) −2.93(0.00) 5.21(1.00) I(1)
FD −2.61(0.00) −5.46(0.00) −7.81(0.00) 3.64(1.00) 333.76(0.00) 327.17(0.00) 0.67(0.75) 1.74(0.96) I(0)
FID 4.47(1.00) −2.19(0.01) −0.89(0.19) 3.21(1.00) 227.71(0.91) 252.34(0.59) −1.29(0.10) 2.81(1.00) I(1)
FIA 15.31(1.00) 8.09(1.00) 4.57(1.00) 3.25(1.00) 240.22(0.78) 267.02(0.34) 2.58(1.00) 4.78(1.00) I(1)
FIE −14.11(0.00) −18.24(0.00) −7.12(0.00) −7.44(0.00) 635.04(0.00) 630.97(0.00) −8.77(0.00) −2.09(0.02) I(0)
Trade −4.49(0.00) 1.14(0.87) 0.53(0.70)
Urbanisation 4.74(1.00) 1.27(0.90) 404.20(0.00) 313.53(0.01) 6.50(1.00) 17.65(1.00) I(1)
Human capital index 13.79(1.00) 5.93(1.00) 4.78(1.00) 2.96(1.00) 162.76(1.00) 202.68(0.67) 7.00(1.00) 18.12(1.00) I(1)
Political stability −14.15(0.00) −8.66(0.00) −12.08(0.00) −7.19(0.00) 566.39(0.00) 459.88(0.00) −7.46(0.00) −3.01(0.00) I(0)
Composite stability −14.19(0.00) −7.97(0.00) −8.53(0.00) −4.59(0.00) 540.94(0.00) 393.79(0.00) −2.80(0.00) −2.53(0.01) I(0)
Absence of corruption −10.05(0.00) −6.71(0.00) −6.73(0.00) −2.46(0.01)
Capital 14.93(1.00) 3.70(1.00) 6.32(1.00) 7.06(1.00) 136.48(1.00) 169.81(0.99) 6.59(1.00) 7.85(1.00) I(1)
Population growth −31.59(0.00) −43.54(0.00) −6.40(0.00) −5.87(0.00) 397.93(0.00) 261.57(0.01) −1.19(0.12) 1.04(0.85) I(0)
Number of bank branches 1.91(0.97) 1.34(0.91) I(1)
Government spending −7.66(0.00) −5.21(0.00) −1.51(0.07) I(0)
Employment in agriculture 3.38(1.00) −2.14(0.02) 7.56(1.00) −2.36(0.01) I(1)
